Management of Current (NWA) IDPs & Swat as a case study

National Defence University, Pakistan
(National Security & War Course)
“Disaster Management In Pakistan – Historical Experiences And Way Forward”
(i)         Management of Current IDPs & Swat as a case study
(ii)          Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Measures
On 27th August, 2014
At 1130-1400 hrs
Muhammad Abid Majeed
Secretary Administration & Coordination FATA
List of Acronyms
Commissioner Afghan Refugees
National Database Registration Authority
Damage and Needs Assessment
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Displaced Persons
National Disaster Management Authority, Pakistan
Disaster Risk Management
National Disaster Management Commission, Pakistan
Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
Non Food Items
Emergency Response Unit for Malakand DPs
Non Governmental Organizations
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
FATA Disaster Management Authority
Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, KP
General Officer Commanding
Provincial Disaster Management Authority KP
Government of Pakistan
Provincial Relief Commissioner
Head of Household
Pakistan Red Crescent Authority
UN Inter Agency Standing Committee
Army’s Special Support Group for Malakand DPs headed by then Commander 1 Corps
International Committee of Red Cross
United Nations
Internally Displaced Persons
United Nations Development Program
International Humanitarian Law
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
International Non Governmental Organization
United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
United Nations Office for Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs
Medicins Sans Frontieres
World Food Program
World Health Organization

DP crisis – Complex Emergency
Disasters are categorized into natural and man-made. [1]For dealing with IDPs, or simply DPs, the classification of complex emergency is used. The UN definition of complex emergency is a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system-wide response. Commonly, a long-term combination of political, conflict, and peacekeeping factors is also involved. The hallmark of disasters and complex emergencies is the need for external assistance and aid. [2][3]
DPs and International Law
Refugees and DPs are protected under International Humanitarian Law. Refugees are people who have crossed an international frontier and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin. IDPs, on the other hand, have not crossed an international frontier, but have, for whatever reason, also fled their homes. Strictly defined, involuntary departure distinguishing IDPs from individuals who leave their areas of origin out of choice & could have otherwise safely remained where they lived. [4]
There is no convention for IDPs equivalent to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, international law protects persons from displacement and once they are IDPs, are protected by IHL and domestic law. Under IHL, people are protected from and during displacement as civilians, provided they do not take a direct part in hostilities. IHL also guarantees access for relief and humanitarian organizations to refugees and IDPs in situations of armed conflict. Parties to a conflict must facilitate the supply of relief materials such as medicines, food, blankets and tents. [5]
Host states bear the primary responsibility for IDP protection and welfare. If unwilling or unable to meet IDP needs, international humanitarian actors may complement the national authorities’ efforts at the latter’s request. 
The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were recognized by Member States of UN as the principal international framework outlining IDPs’ rights. No single UN agency is formally incharge of IDPs.
Operationally; UNHCR has been entrusted to lead protection efforts of crisis-affected IDPs. In raising awareness to the plight of IDPs, UN-OCHA works in close partnership with Security Council bodies, UNHCR, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs to the Human Rights Council, protection-related IASC agencies and UN Secretariat organizations to promote the development of national legal frameworks and policies on internal displacement.[6]UNOCHA or simply OCHA is the part of the UN Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. [7]
Humanitarian Response
The internationally accepted Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response in such situations have been determined in the late 1990s to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of assistance, and have been constantly improved by the international agencies, humanitarian NGOs and other stake holders based on the philosophy; “the right to life with dignity”. The two responses are (i) Relief; and (ii) Protection. [8]The two core beliefs are: firstly; right to life with dignity and therefore right to assistance, and secondly; all possible measures to alleviate human suffering arising out of a disaster or crisis, hence protection.
The key life-saving sectors include water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action. The ‘Protection’ principles include activities that benefit in particular those who are most affected and vulnerable, such activities contribute towards protection against violence and human rights abuses or recovery from such abuses. Women, children, older people, persons with disabilities may be denied vital assistance or the opportunity to be heard due to physical, cultural and/or social barriers and are therefore the vulnerable.
The roles and responsibilities of humanitarian agencies in protection are, generally, secondary to the legal responsibility of the state or other relevant authorities. Protection often involves reminding these authorities of their responsibilities.
Role of Armed Forces in Humanitarian Response
As part of the United Nations Protection Force for Bosnia NATO command realized that as a ‘force’ having all the logistics, air support and manpower, a fighting force could also provide direct support in humanitarian assistance. [9]It was during that time too that the Pakistan Army also realized this and participated in humanitarian efforts.
“Recognizing the commendable performance of the Pakistan Army Contingents as UN Peacekeepers in Somalia and Kampuchea, the UN requested the GoP to contribute troops to the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A 3000 strong contingent consisting of two Battalion Groups and a National Support Headquarters left for Bosnia and Croatia in May 1994. The two-battalion groups were deployed in the towns near the city of Tuzla in Bosnia while the National Support Headquarters remained based at Split, Croatia. They were tasked to stabilize the military situation with a view to encouraging return of normalcy, improving freedom of movement by maintaining existing routes, providing protection and supporting various UN agencies and NGOs engaged in their relief activities and coordinate humanitarian assistance” [10]
The UN has recognized a United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) mechanism maintaining that it is necessary that there is essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from co-existence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. [11]
The Pakistani military plays an important role in emergency response within the country too. In the light of increasing decentralization of Disaster Risk Reduction to provinces and districts, there is need to strengthen civil-military coordination to pursue common goals and minimize inconsistencies. Coordination as a shared responsibility should include a) joint planning covering agreed alert and mobilization procedures; b) information sharing including the sharing of Standard Operating Procedures, c) task division; and d) hand-over procedures between civilian authorities and the military where appropriate. Joint simulations can help to clarify coordination and cooperation modalities. Overall there is a need to define the use of military assets in natural, industrial and conflict emergencies (as well as in emergencies where conflict and natural hazards overlap) in specific guidelines for Pakistan. [12]
Risk Reduction And Disaster Management Measures – Pakistan’s perspective
In December 2006 in the backdrop of Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA, 2005-2015) and earthquake 2005 in the country, the National Disaster Management Ordinance was introduced as a legal instrument for disaster management in Pakistan. This legal instrument provides for the establishment of an institutional system and legal framework for all phases of disaster including inter-alia: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, contingency planning (Pre-disaster phase), rescue, response, relief (during disaster phase) and early recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction (Post-disaster phase) in addition to devising policies and strategies and developing Disaster Risk Management plans and programs at federal, provincial, and district levels.
Swat DPs – Humanitarian Response
In the first week of May 2009, Pakistan Army launched an operation against the militants in Buner, Lower Dir and Swat. According to the verified estimates of NADRA, some 2 million people from the Malakand Division left their homes and fled to camps, schools, homes and other places of shelter across N.W.F.P. Those who were in the camps, had to live in temperature above 40 degrees and the risk of dehydration and disease was extremely high. Those who were not living in the camps had taken refuge with host community, relatives, friends, and schools or in rented houses. The host community was bearing an extra burden to provide IDPs adequate shelter, food and other necessities, as it did not have the capacity to do so. Some family members (mostly women and children) fled their areas of origin while others (mostly men and teenage boys) stayed behind to safeguard their homes. It was very difficult for them to secure food and shelter. The IDPs had been deprived off their livestock assets and economic means and had no source of sustainable income.
UNHCR head, Antonio Guterres, said the displacement was bigger and faster than the movement of people following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The mass exodus of the IDPs had put an immense pressure on the government of Pakistan as well as the international community to respond to the needs of the displaced people.
(i)           Establishment of ERU and SSG [13]
The Chief Secretary KP established an ERU, comprising senior officers, to strengthen the PRC and the PDMA setup, and with the main objective to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with government, non-government, national and international agencies and all the stakeholders in order to lessen human suffering in the IDPs crisis. In addition to being a coordinator, the ERU also acted as an administrator and organizer by managing and monitoring the IDPs camps and organizing various events and training sessions for the IDPs to improve their living conditions and standards. Parallel to this, the Pakistan Army established an SSG headed by the Commander 1 Corps, placed at Peshawar. After a while the SSG placed one of its officers in ERU and vice versa and the coordination got more efficient consequently.
(ii)         Strategic Organization of ERU
The ERU was structured in:
a)    Policy and Strategy Committee,
b)   Operational Coordination Committee, and
c)    Clusters
The Policy and Strategy committee worked under the Chief Secretary N.W.F.P. It had membership from PRC-ERU, SSG, UN-OCHA, UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF, ICRC, MSF, UNDP, Home Secretary, FATA Secretariat, Social Welfare Department of the NWFP, and the CAR. These members performed the following tasks:
Operations and Response Coordination
SSG (1 Corps)
Coordination and ERU Support
Humanitarian Coordination
Food and Agriculture / Logistics
Camp Management, Protection, Shelter & NFI
Nutrition, Education, WASH
Early Recovery
Home Secretary
Law and Order
FATA Secretariat
FATA affairs
Social Welfare
Registration outside camps
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugee
Registration inside Camp
(iii)       The Relief Clusters
The ERU worked with nine different cluster that are Health and Nutrition, WASH, Food and Agriculture, Camp Management, Protection, Logistics, Education, Shelter and Early Recovery Network, in order to strengthen the technical and administrative capacity during the provision of humanitarian aid. The lead international agencies in these clusters are given in the table at (ii) above.
(iv)        DP Camps Management
UNHCR was mainly responsible for the management of the IDP camps and ERU appointed Civil Officers as Camp In-charges.  and also briefed 45 probationers and appointed them as in-charges of the food hubs. Camps were established in Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda, Nowshera and Peshawar. Around 12 % of the DP families got themselves registered in Camps but a majority lived off camp and kept the registration in camp for the purposes of obtaining cooked food initially and dry rations later. The SSG provided security to the camps and dedicated its officers for coordination purposes.
(v)          Communications strategy
The Media Cell of ERU established a website that offered assessments, situation reports, minutes, meeting schedule, financial tracking system, and a contact directory amongst many other useful services and information. Through these efforts ERU ensured that information collected and analyzed by clusters was shared with all the stakeholders. UN-HABITAT was asked to convert the available information into maps. SSG also held regular press briefings.
(vi)        The 3 x Ws
One of the most singular initiatives was to frame a crystal statement of “Who is doing What & Where”. Exact details of which NGO, INGO, donor or humanitarian organization, government’s department and the Pakistan Army through SSG were not only maintained but also shared with each stakeholder. This resulted in efficient response and avoidance of duplication of efforts and wastage of resources.
(vii)      Off-Camp DPs
74 % of the DP families lived off Camp with host families while 13 % occupied space in 3683 Government schools. The occupation of these schools could have seriously jeopardized the start of educational activities after summer vacations but the IDPs returned to their area of origin before that.
Out of the off-camp families Mardan hosted 43 % followed by 20 % in Swabi and 16 % in Peshawar. These DPs as well as their host families were provided immediate support through access to health and education facilities in the area, direct support with household items, food and shelter materials. IDPs living in rented accommodation could not afford payments. These IDP families were given access the “Benazir Support Program” Cash Grant scheme with a payment of Rs 1000/- per family per month and facilitated through NADRA in issuance of computerized National Identity Cards to women. A relief package of Rs. 25000 from the provincial government and Rs. 5000 from Pakistan Bait-ulMal to each family were also given.
(viii)    Smart Cards
“Smart” IDP registration cards were issued by NADRA with support from UNHCR, which allowed a more efficient management of assistance to the registered families. The cards allowed to “load” cash assistance, vouchers for NFIs and food and access to services.
(ix)        Security
The Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar was bombed on 9 June 2009. All International Staff were evacuated from Peshawar. Two UN staff (UNICEF & UNHCR) were killed and two WFP staff were injured during the attack. The entire operation came to a halt. UN offices in Peshawar reopened on 11 June with National Staff.
(x)          Transparency in financial management
To ensure, and to be seen to have ensured, financial transparency details of all expenditure were placed on the web site and a Donation Tracking System was set in place. The donors could also track their donation by entering the receipt number in the Donation Tracking System on the ERU website. To enhance the credibility of Pakistan with the donor agencies, the food items were given to the WFP and other UN agencies.


(xi)        Registration Process of NGOs and INGOs
GoP had an open-door policy to most INGOs arriving in mid-1980s, largely due to the substantial funding which was being received from USAID. Since 1990, Pakistan has suffered several disasters. During this period there has been a corresponding increase in the number of humanitarian agencies based in Pakistan. When the earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, very few humanitarian agencies were in an immediate position to respond. The Government of Pakistan response to the earthquake was swift.
Within 12 hours, an open invitation to international humanitarian agencies had been issued, and the Government made efforts to facilitate their arrival, registration and access. For example, the need for a No Objection Certificate which international agencies must usually obtain for access to certain areas such as AJK was removed, enabling free international access to sensitive areas for the first time in decades. The openness of the Government led to a huge influx of international humanitarian agencies in the weeks following the earthquake.
In the past, Government of Pakistan mostly relied on humanitarian and donor agencies every time a disaster struck. But in the IDPs crisis ERU as a government institution applied a better approach and made sure that in each cluster the donor agencies were led by a government agency, ensuring the participation of the government in the relief efforts.
(xii)      Early Recovery Framework
In ordinary circumstances anywhere in the world, the UN system conducts a Rapid assessment for the early recovery / community restoration. In the case of Malakand however, it was the provincial government, which took the initiative much before the UN (local knowledge and access were the main advantages). Because of the commitment of the provincial government ample allocations were also made and by the time the UN, through UNDP, unveiled its early recovery framework i.e. Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment (CERINA), the government was already half way through its early restoration works. This had the advantage of diversion of UN resources to the much-needed rehabilitation of social sectors.


(xiii)    Damage and Needs Assessment
In April 2009, the GoP requested International Financial Institutions including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to help in validating a DNA for medium to long term recovery in the five crisis affected districts of NWFP and two tribal agencies of FATA. The broad scope of work of the DNA includes: (a) quantification and validation of physical damages caused by the crisis; (b) development of sector level strategies for the immediate restoration of (public and private) infrastructure, services, and livelihoods, and; (c) quantification of corresponding needs in respect of the immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation of critical damaged infrastructure and services and the restoration of livelihood opportunities.
The DNA was led by ADB and WB. The team was facilitated by the Economic Affairs Division of GoP, PaRRSA and the SSG. The total estimated cost of immediate reconstruction and recovery is US $1,087 million for the five NWFP districts and two FATA agencies. The sectors covered have been broadly classified as: Social Sectors (Livelihood and Social Protection, Housing, Education, Health); Physical Infrastructure (Transport, Water and Sanitation, Energy);
Productive Sectors (Private Sector, Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation); and Cross cutting Themes (Environment and Governance Infrastructure). [14]
North Waziristan DPs – Humanitarian Response [15]

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was initiated by the Pakistan Army against militancy in North Waziristan Agency and the Agency was declared as ‘Conflict Zone’ on June 18, 2014. In order to protect the lives of the residents, the inhabitants of the area were asked to move to safer places. Resultantly, the tribesmen started movement out of the Agency.

(i)            Establishment of a Response Unit
Probably as two different governments were involved (which was more the reason to have one), no singular ERU has been established in the civilian set-up. The PM House has however notified GOC 45 Engrs Div as the Coordinator, who has established a small Secretariat. The PDMA and FDMA are working under separate hierarchies with the Chief Secretary being the commonality. Meetings happen in GHQ, SAFRON, at Governor’s House and other offices regularly but there is no single grip or focal point. The apparent lack or coordination and information can be attributed to the absence of a Policy and Strategy set up backed by an Operational Coordination Committee.
(ii)         The Relief Clusters
The nine Relief cluster that are Health and Nutrition, WASH, Food and Agriculture, Camp Management, Protection, Logistics, Education, Shelter and Early Recovery Network are there but the international and national staff is un-clear on who to respond and how to. Their support is readily available to PDMA KP but when it comes to FATA there is less willingness due to the Army’s implementation of security lens to the extreme. The DP Camp has been established in FR Bannu in a security compromised and hostile weather area and entry to it is strictly regulated. With such barriers, most UN Agencies and INGOs find it improbable to provide support.
(iii)       DP Camps Management
UNHCR was mainly responsible for the management of the IDP camps but as in the instant case there are issues of access and Army’s role in management of the Camp, the Camp has been established by FDMA through federal funding. Recently, Camp Incharge has been given enough space to try and establish a management system. Only 565 families have so far gone to live in the Camp, which is less than 1.5 % of the verified families.
(iv)        Communications strategy – CGTM
There is no central Media Cells, rather every Federal and Provincial authority has been giving separate statements to media. The prevalent trend is of CGTM, i.e. Credit Goes to Me. This has led to fragmentation in response to public perception as well as the phenomenon of VIPs going for ‘Disaster Tourism’ towards Bannu and the Camp, for photo sessions and hindering relief activities.
(v)          The 3 x Ws
One of the most singular initiatives of ERU was to frame a crystal statement of “Who is doing What & Where”. Exact details of which NGO, INGO, donor or humanitarian organization, government’s department and the Pakistan Army through SSG were not only maintained but also shared with each stakeholder. This resulted in efficient response and avoidance of duplication of efforts and wastage of resources. There is NO such practice while dealing with DPs of North.
(vi)        Off-Camp DPs
98.5 % of the DP families are off Camp with host families including 2004 families in 986 schools. The families living in Schools in Bannu and FR Bannu are 3.5 % of the overall verified families. The occupation of these schools has seriously jeopardized the start of educational activities after summer vacations as the IDP families are adamant in not leaving these buildings and there is no return plan in sight.
(vii)      Cash Payments
The GoP has approved payment of Rs 12000 monthly, Rs 20000 as Ramazan Package and Rs 5000 as one time grant for NFIs to IDPs. Government of KP has pledged Rs 3000 per month as rent and Punjab Government has pledged Rs 7000 as monthly grant during their stay. So for the first month the IDPs HoH got Rs 47000 and they will continue getting Rs 22000 per month. Such a package has not been granted to any IDPs previously. 96699 families have been registered by FDMA out of which 54080 have been verified. Till date (23 Aug, 2014) out of the 54080 NADRA verified families, 50760 HoH have received Rs 1658 Mil only out of the Federal Government fund alone.
The payment is being made through Timepay ® services of Zong Mobile Company and Askari Bank. Food sustenance continues to be provided through the WFP despite the cash grants on that account.
(viii)    Security Lens
Due to genuine security concerns, the IDPs from North Waziristan have been dealt different to all previous cases. The DP Camp is in an area not easily accessible even to civil officers and machinery. Camps in Bannu have been discouraged. However, despite such verifications etc, the data obtained from Zong about location of payments drawn has shown that DP families are now all over Punjab, Sindh, some areas of Baluchistan and nearly all the Districts of KP. The security lens has however, to some extent, discouraged INGOs and local NGOs from supporting the GoP in humanitarian effort.


(ix)        Registration Process of NGOs and INGOs
One of the reasons that Malakand became a success story was the support of the UN, bilateral, multi-lateral agencies as well as INGOs. This support helped bridge the capacity and resource gap of the government. Starting from registration to food, shelter, health, sanitation, education etc. specialized UN agencies and INGOs partnered with the respective government departments. Because of the security concern and a stronger lens focusing more on security operations, the government decided to bar access to almost all the international organizations. This has resulted in putting the whole burden on the government agencies in delivery of services in all the above-mentioned sectors.
(x)          Early Recovery Framework
Since there is hardly an access to the international organizations who could be expected to help the government in this important activity, HQ 11 Corps, 45 Eng. Div. and FATA Secretariat have decided to initiate this process as an in house activity. For this purpose, the forces deployed in North Waziristan have already conducted a survey and prepared a report. This assessment will serve as an initial baseline for a survey, which has already started on 25th Aug 2014. Dedicated teams comprising of Pakistan Army personnel, representatives of the government departments and, if possible, local community will validate the list already prepared in the first phase of the survey. The teams would add or delete the listings as per the physical verification. This whole set of menu will also be validated through satellite pictures of pre and post operation with the help of SUPARCO.
Disaster Management Planning in Pakistan


As DRM encompasses a wider range of interests and abilities, there is a growing requirement for political and professional collaborations and partnerships. These inter-relationships address multi-level (national and sub-national), multi-hazard (flood, cyclone, earthquake, landslide, fire and volcano eruptions), multi-sector (health, education, planning, transportation and construction), multi-phase (preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery) and multi-stakeholder (government, NGOs, community groups, private sector, and civil society) approaches. [16]
Pakistan’s institutional structures for disaster management included the ‘Emergency Relief Cell’ consequent to cyclone of 1970 in East Pakistan, [17] the Meteorological Department with 73 Met Stations spread across the country, [18] the Federal Floods Commission, the National Crisis Management Cell under the Ministry of Interior, the Civil Defence, Dams Safety Council and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). Its dependence of civil Departments such as Police, Communication & Works, Irrigation and even the Pakistan Army still does not indicate any management mechanism of DP crisis.
The GoP is more inclined towards managing response to disaster, that too through an emergency response, than towards risk management and focusing on the fundamental concepts of vulnerabilities leading to disasters. However the October 8, 2005 earthquake that has changed the perception and attitude of the government completely.
The Federal Relief Commission was established soon after the 2005 earthquake and it was mandated to streamline the relief operations in collaboration with Provincial governments, relevant ministries, NGOs, Red Crescent and other international agencies as well as the army. ERRA was created in the mid of October, 2005 for the medium and long-term rebuilding efforts to serve as the main interface with international lending institutions, other international organizations, as well as with national authorities and philanthropic organizations focusing on the rehabilitation of the affected areas. The Federal Relief Commission was then absorbed into ERRA on 1st April 2006, which continues to be the principal actor in the reconstruction efforts.[19]
There is now a growing realization that hazard becomes a disaster only when communities, structures and institutions are too weak and vulnerable to withstand its force and there is a need of more coordinated and large-scale relief response. Pakistan signed the full implementation of the Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015 and the commitments related to assistance for developing countries in the post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes.[20]
On December 21, 2006 the National Disaster Management Ordinance was passed which led to the formation of NDMC and NDMA. The NDMC, which falls under the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, is the highest decision making body for integration of disaster risk reduction and management into mainstream development. NDMA has been established to be the coordinating body for cross-sectorial disaster management program. NDMA major functions are identification of national hazards and vulnerabilities, institutional, legal and community capacity building, mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into development and coordinating the efforts of all national and international institutions working in any sphere of disaster risk reduction. All national agencies such as ERRA, Federal Flood Commission, Civil Defence, Fire Services, Drought Emergency Relief Program, all government departments, ministries, media, NGO’s and donors must make their resources available to NDMA and PDMA in case of disasters.[21]
DP Management protocols in Pakistan
UN’s 30 guiding principals of Internal Displacement [22]include that the national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs, there shall be no discrimination based on race, language, beliefs, origins, age etc., displacement should be as dignified as possible, every IDP would have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence etc.
The NDMA’s Monsoon Contingency Plan details what resources are existing and to be maintained and what actions are required by various governments as well as other stake-holders but there is no policy and no standard response for DP crisis. The NDMA has taken measures to enhance the capacity of different stake holders and helping them in understanding and practicing various aspects of disaster management like early warning, planning / coordination / managing responses to urban and rural flooding including: rescue, evacuation / relocation, camp management, logistic needs and damage assessment but again there is no road-map for DP displacement out of a conflict area.[23]
Similarly, the Contingency Plan of the KP Government, which has been prepared after various consultations with Provincial Departments, NDMA, Federal Agencies, Army Corps of Engineers/ 11 Corps, District Administrations, PRCS, Humanitarian Community including DRR Forum and NHN, painstakingly spells out in minute detail the coordination mechanism for early warning, search and rescue, relief operations and meeting needs of vulnerable segments for the Monsoons and the duties of various stakeholders in that but there is no plan whatsoever for DPs humanitarian support.
PDMA coordinates execution of these functions with all provincial entities and federal agencies i.e. Pak Armed Forces, NDMA, Emergency Relief Cell, National Logistic Cell, Pakistan Metrological Department etc. PDMA also constitutes the point of contact for deploying external assistance for disaster response through the General Coordination Meeting (GCM) to UN agencies, INGOs and donors consistent with provincial and national policies. Similar processes are followed at the district tier by DCs assisted by the newly formed DDMUs.
The plan even indicates the actions to be taken by the HQ 11 Corps of the Pakistan army which are establishment of Flood Coordination Centres as per Army’s Plan, assistance of provincial government in search & rescue and response operations when 
called in aid of civil administration etc. The plan goes on to say that on formal requisitioning of Army in flood relief operation, all available resources will be mobilized. [24]
Lessons Learnt, Issues and Way Forward
Despite clear international regulations and standards, Pakistan’s disaster management structure has no, or negligible, standards and procedures when it comes to DP management. Moreover, when it comes to DP management across more than one province or administrative units, there is no focused, unified command, policy and strategy structure. The coordination mechanism under the Constitution is provided in the shape of Council of Common Interests and Inter Provincial Coordination Committee but such constitutional fora seldom meet and have diverse directions of velocity due to political affiliations of the Provinces or federal government. The National Disaster Management Commission also has membership from the civil and military side but it does not translate into a proper strategic and policy command structure with mandate to NDMA in particular cases of complex emergency where the humanitarian effort is across administrative units / provinces. That mandate can be there in the shape of Civil Military Liaison Offices on the analogy of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) [25]mechanism enunciated by NATO in Kosovo specifically for cooperation between NATO units on the one hand and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United Nations, etc.) on the other.
The role and strengths in human resource, logistics etc of Pakistan Army are being utilized whenever there is a disaster or complex emergency. However, there is no inter-institution coordination and roadmap for increasing efficiency of such support. This is further exacerbated due to the lack of understanding of how the civil and military institutions work by the military and civil bureaucracy respectively. This gap becomes more acute when the issue of provision of finances for various activities arises – both institutions have separate financial management systems which are not compatible with each other. The compulsion of fulfilling of codal formalities by one is taken as inaction by the other. A permanent Civil-Military Coordination Mechanism based on proper role allocation and SOPs needs to be set in place which keeps a liaison at all times and ups a gear or two during complex emergencies. This arrangement would be in consonance with Article 245 of the Constitution which enunciates calling upon the army in aid of civil administration in any adverse circumstances.
The phenomenon of CGTM (Credit Goes to Me) needs to be discouraged by making every stakeholder realize the stakes of the other. The civil setup needs to understanding that every action and operation against militants, even if endorsed or led by political leadership, causes hardships to general public and blame is placed squarely on the Armed Forces despite them sacrificing men and material. Their initiatives to win hearts and minds is an effort towards mellowing down such adverse reactions. Similarly, the khakis need to take cognizance of the fact that the political leadership has the opposition and the next election in the back of their mind. The best way forward in such a situation would be a communication strategy based on coordinated optics, which ensures joint face to the press and the people bearing the burden of criticism and credit for kudos in the name of State of Pakistan.
While the security lens in dealing with DPs coming out of conflict areas is important, hindrances in grant of access to humanitarian agencies, INGOs and local NGOs create misunderstandings and over-burdening of GoP in relief efforts which are funded and managed by the UN Agencies the world over. Delays in grant of security clearance deter such organizations as most of them are funded by tax payers’ money of western countries and in the absence of access and monitoring permissions it becomes very difficult for them to satisfy their donors. Furthermore, such INGOs are acceptable world over and it becomes very difficult for the local administration to defend non-grant of NOC to them. The easier way would be that in case there are some elements whose activities are not desirable, their entry should be regulated at the time of grant of visa – so that the organizations could recommend alternate staff members. Similarly, accounting system to ensure coupling of both military and civilian financial management mechanisms in times of emergency needs to be done.
Statistics show that in the Malakand Division IDP crisis less than 13 % of DP families opted for Camps (and a sizable majority out of those too just for cooked food and rations) and in the current movement, less than 1.5 % has opted for the Camp while establishment and running of Camps is an expensive business. It is therefore recommended that instead a sizable cash grant which takes care of food sustenance, rented accommodation and a stipend for other expenditure is granted to the families to make their own arrangements. One of the positives in such an arrangement that the local economy of the host communities, which get encumbered due to such a huge population mass making them a minority in their own area and taxing the infrastructure and services, will also improve when the DPs spend the money to acquire food, NFIs and other services.

[1] accessed on Aug 20, 2014
[3] Miguel Albala-Bertrand, What is a complex humanitarian emergency, Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London
[4] Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Global Protection Cluster Working Group, Mar 2010
[7] accessed on Aug 19, 2014
[8] Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, The Sphere Project
[9] First hand interaction of General officer of NATO with Mr Shakeel Qadir Khan, the then DG Provincial Disaster Management Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (now Secretary Law & Order, FATA)
[12] National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy  2012
[13] IDP Crisis 2009: An Analysis of the Emergency Response Unit, Government of NWFP, Pakistan
[14] Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, Immediate Restoration and Medium Term Reconstruction in Crisis Affected Areas, prepared by Asian Development Bank and World Bank for Government of Pakistan
[15] Report on DP’s support – FDMA’s perspective, 31.7.2014
[16] Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives
[19] ERRA and IASC Country Team, 2006
[20] National Disaster Risk Management Framework Pakistan, 2007
[22] Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations
[23] National Monsoon Contingency Plan 2014, National Disaster Management Authority, Government of Pakistan
[24] Monsoon Contingency Plan 2014, Provincial Disaster Management Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
[25] Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo